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This article explores the notion that the brain is genetically endowed with an innate virtual
reality generator that – through experience-dependent plasticity – becomes a generative
or predictive model of the world. This model, which is most clearly revealed in rapid eye
movement (REM) sleep dreaming, may provide the theater for conscious experience.
Functional neuroimaging evidence for brain activations that are time-locked to rapid eye
movements (REMs) endorses the view that waking consciousness emerges from REM
sleep – and dreaming lays the foundations for waking perception. In this view, the
brain is equipped with a virtual model of the world that generates predictions of its
sensations. This model is continually updated and entrained by sensory prediction errors
in wakefulness to ensure veridical perception, but not in dreaming. In contrast, dreaming
plays an essential role in maintaining and enhancing the capacity to model the world by
minimizing model complexity and thereby maximizing both statistical and thermodynamic
efﬁciency. This perspective suggests that consciousness corresponds to the embodied
process of inference, realized through the generation of virtual realities (in both sleep
and wakefulness). In short, our premise or hypothesis is that the waking brain engages
with the world to predict the causes of sensations, while in sleep the brain’s generative
model is actively reﬁned so that it generates more efﬁcient predictions during waking.We
review the evidence in support of this hypothesis – evidence that grounds consciousness
in biophysical computations whose neuronal and neurochemical infrastructure has been
disclosed by sleep research.
Keywords: sleep, consciousness, virtual reality, prediction, free energy, rapid eye movements, pontine-geniculate-
occipital waves, neuromodulation
INTRODUCTION
What can sleep and dreaming tell us about consciousness (Windt
and Noreika, 2011)? The answer offered in this article regards
waking and sleeping consciousness as complementary and neces-
sary for each other. This circular dependency rests upon a view
of the brain as an organ of inference, generating virtual reali-
ties to explain the waking sensorium – and optimizing generative
models during sleep. This view appears to be consistent with the
neurobiology of sleep and the phenomenology of dreaming. This
article considers the evidence that links active visual (conscious
and unconscious) inference in waking and rapid eye movements
(REMs) in sleep.
Our waking perception rests on a reconstruction of the world
by the brain – a fantasy or hypothesis that explains sensations
that are sampled from the world (Gregory, 1980). This article sug-
gests that the capacity to model the world underlies perception
in both waking and dreaming. We further propose that dreaming
is a crucial prelude to waking perception. In brief, we associate
conscious (and unconscious) perception with predictions of sen-
sory inputs during waking – predictions that are generated by an
internal model of the world that is embodied by the brain. In
sleep, we hypothesize that this model is optimized so that it gen-
eralizes to novel situations in waking; thereby furnishing more
efﬁcient predictions and (statistical) modeling of sensory data.
Crucially, this optimisation in sleep rests on the same neuronal
mechanisms (i.e., synaptic activity and plasticity) that are engaged
during waking perception. This provides a functional (model
optimisation) and phenomenal (perceptual inference) account
of dreaming. Because dreaming is highly correlated with REM
sleep, the statistical and energetic functions of REM sleep may
therefore inform the neurobiology of conscious and unconscious
processing. REM sleep frees the brain from sensory enslavement –
disclosing its constructive and integrative processes. As noted by
Revonsuo (2006, p.75) dreaming “reveals consciousness in a very
special, pure, and isolated form.”Our premise is that this freedom
is necessary for model optimisation, during which the brain can
rehearse ﬁctive scenarios that may or may not be encountered in
waking.
This article addresses the phenomenology of dreaming, the
neurophysiology of REM sleep, its ontogeny, its phylogeny, and
its manifestation over the life span – all of which can be inter-
preted under a virtual reality hypothesis. When a Helmholtzian
formulation of the inferential brain is applied to these data, new
statistical, and thermodynamic principles emerge, which extend
the explanatory power of the virtual reality hypothesis – and may
cast new light on the nature of consciousness and its disorders. We
will call on promising lines of research that establish the validity of
this hypothesis; particularly in relation to the inferential processes
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that underlie consciousness. The Ego or Self concept that emerges
from this treatment owes much to the work of physiologists and
philosophers who emphasize the predictive aspects of the brain in
grounding (waking and dreaming) consciousness in a ﬁrst-person
explanation of the sensorium (Llinás and Paré, 1991; Revonsuo,
1995; Metzinger, 2009, 2013). In this view, the embodied self
is a dynamic construct of the brain that is established during
sleep (and in utero) and carried forward – ﬁt for purpose – into
waking.
Speciﬁcally, we propose that REMsleep is an occasion for reiter-
ating and optimizing a generative model of the embodied self with
reference to waking experience. This updating rests upon maxi-
mizing the statistical – and implicitly thermodynamic – efﬁciency
of generative models of the embodied self. In other words, REM
sleep is necessary to minimize their complexity. Our emphasis on
the self-as-agent is basedon the observation that dreams are almost
always ﬁrst-person. We see this fact as supporting the idea that
self-model is a construct of the brain and a central part of a phe-
nomenal experience. In other words, the self is the foundational
epicenter of a world from which we sample sensations.
This article comprises two parts: in the ﬁrst two sections,
we overview some important phenomenological and neurobio-
logical aspects of sleep and dreaming. In the remaining (four)
sections, we lay out our theoretical framework and then try
to account for the empirical facts established in the ﬁrst two
sections. In detail, we ﬁrst review the phenomenology of dreams,
with a special focus on the dreaming associated with REM sleep.
We then provide a selective summary of neurobiological ﬁnd-
ings from sleep research that inform the functional anatomy
of REM sleep. Our focus here is on early neurophysiologi-
cal discoveries and more recent advances using brain imaging
and neuropsychology. This section closes with a brief treat-
ment of lucid dreaming that has important implications for
hierarchical models in the brain. The third section introduces
the Helmholtzian perspective and generative models, linking
the virtual reality and Bayesian brain hypotheses. Speciﬁcally,
we will look at perceptual inference in dreaming and wake-
fulness from the perspective of predictive coding – and the
role of sleep in Bayesian model optimization. The subsequent
section pursues optimization; highlighting a fundamental link
between the thermodynamic and statistical efﬁciency afforded by
Bayesian model optimization. The penultimate section reviews
the empirical evidence for the ensuing role of sleep and dreaming,
which is considered from a philosophical perspective in the ﬁnal
section.
THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF DREAMS
In reviewing the phenomenological contrast between waking and
dreaming, we will emphasize dream states associated with REM
sleep, acknowledging that there are many interesting distinctions
(and commonalities) between REM and non-REM sleep. Waking
and dreaming have important similarities and marked differ-
ences. Chief among the similarities are the vivid and detailed
perceptions and marked emotions that characterize both states.
These similarities are often interpreted as copies of waking by
dreaming but might as well be predictions of waking by dream-
ing – as we will argue. Our point here is not to stump for an
either/or distinction but rather to explore the idea that wak-
ing and dreaming are both leaders and followers. Indeed, one
might argue that “not only are dreams experiences but, in a way,
all experiences are dreams” (Revonsuo, 2006, p.55). Dreaming
tells waking what to expect and waking veriﬁes or refutes those
expectations.
Chief among the differences is the fact that dreaming is, by
deﬁnition, virtual; since its subjective attributes are fabricated
internally. The internal fabrication of dreams has been seen as
the replay of remembered experience but this cannot be the expla-
nation of much dream imagery, which either has no identiﬁable
mnemonic source or may even run counter to those sources that
are readily identiﬁed and easily speciﬁed in waking. It is this
synthetic feature that gives dreaming its deserved pride of place
in the psychology of the imagination. Dream synthesis compels
us to consider the predictive and creative role that we assign to
dreaming.
Other important differences between waking and dreaming are
notable: waking memory is greatly enfeebled in dreaming. So
is orientation, especially to time and place – as well as to third
(but not ﬁrst) persons. Logical inference is virtually impossible
in dreaming. While emotions overlap to some extent, dreaming
is associated with a narrower range and a greater depth of emo-
tion than waking – as if dreaming were some proving ground
for instinctual feelings. Movement is imagined but not actually
enacted in dreaming (with the important exception of eye move-
ments) – as if dreaming were a warm-up exercise for the game of
waking.
Many of these observations come from formal analyses of
dreaming phenomenology that provides direct access to anatomy
of subjective processing. Formal analysis emphasizes the form of
the dream as opposed to its content. Formal analysis may be pre-
ferred to content analysis (Freud, 1920; Hall and Van de Castle,
1966) in the study of how virtual realities are generated by the
brain. To clarify the distinction between formal and content anal-
ysis, we will present and analyze a specimen dream recorded by
one of us (AH) using both its form and content:
Execution dream (9/23/2011): sometime after 3 AM I had the
following vivid dream:
I was in a very large and elegant apartment (not mine or any other place
that I recognize).
There was to be a series of two or maybe three stereotyped killings that I
had arranged or at least approved. Each killing was the shooting, by long
riﬂe, of a victim unknown to me but who deserved to die. In each case, the
murder was accomplished by a couple (again people unknown to me). I
could clearly see the victim and the murderous couple; feel satisfaction as
one member of the couple, usually the man, took careful aim at his victim
who did not ﬂinch from fear or apprehension. I don’t recall ever hearing a
shot, or seeing any victim fall but the series of executions was carried out
efﬁciently at my behest. I was mildly surprised but very satisﬁed to see it
all go so well.
When this had gone on for what I would estimate to be about 5 or maybe
10 min, I began to feel frightened. What if the police came? Would I be
arrested?
Suddenly I myself was holding a gun. The weapon was a poorly made riﬂe
with the stock and barrel fastened together with crude screws and nuts. I
reasoned that I could dismount this weapon and hide its parts. But where?
The police would surely look under the mattresses that I considered as
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possible hiding places. I asked myself, what if the police also realize that I
had engineered an earlier crime (of which I was sure I had dreamt before).
FORMAL ANALYSIS (FIRST PERSON)
In terms of its form, this is a typical REM sleep dream with
vivid percepts (McCarley and Hoffman, 1981), delusional belief
(Hobson et al., 2000), cognitive defects (Hobson and Stickgold,
1994; Stickgold et al., 2001), and both indifference and intense
feeling (Merritt et al., 1994). My perceptions were detailed and
hallucinatory with strong and clear visual imagery. I never once
suspected that I was dreaming, always supposing, erroneously, that
I was awake. I was disoriented – having no idea where I was, how
I got there, or where I might go next.
In terms of the suggestion that dreaming reinforces the sense
of self-as-agent, it is important to stress that I never assumed that
I was anyone but me in the dream, yet I had no idea who my
hired assassins might be or who the victims were – or even why
they were victims. This brutal aggressiveness did not bother me
at all in the dream. Other emotions, such as anxiety and appre-
hension, were strong once I realized what had transpired. My
thought processes were grossly impaired, especially with respect to
the (almost) complete loss of critical self-reﬂective awareness and
insight.
In the second part of the dream I did begin to worry about
the consequences of the executions, conﬁrming the assertions of
Kahan and LaBerge (2010) that self-reﬂective awareness is never
completely absent from dreams. I was holding a makeshift gun
and wondering how to dismantle and hide it lest my part in the
murders be discovered by the police. It seems likely that this shift
to a more rational, detached observational and reﬂective stance in
the second part of the dream would be accompanied by frontal
lobe activation and a reciprocal weakening of REM physiology –
as seen in lucid dreaming (Voss et al., 2009).
CONTENT ANALYSIS
A dream content analyst or therapist might well be interested in
my murderous impulses and how they relate to my life. Content-
wise, this was an unusual dream for me. In my dreams as in
my waking life, I am usually engaged and ecstatic, with positive
social interaction and affect. I am almost never the dispassionate,
detached voyeur of this particular dream scenario. But, I must
admit this was my dream – so I need to take responsibility for its
content
Many of the formal properties of dreams can be reliably
recognized and measured, allowing subjective experience to be
correlated with physiological or behavioral responses: for exam-
ple, in sensory perception (Hong et al., 1997, 2009; Horikawa
et al., 2013), visual scanning (Roffwarg et al., 1962; Herman et al.,
1984; Hong et al., 1995), motor control (Dresler et al., 2012),
language (Hong et al., 1996), multisensory binding (Llinas and
Ribary, 1993; Hong et al., 2009), and the organization of intrin-
sic brain networks (Koike et al., 2011). Furthermore, considerable
experience has been accrued using sleep lab reports and home-
based data (Hobson, 1988, 1999, 2002; Hobson and Stickgold,
1994; Kahn and Hobson, 1994, 2005; Resnick et al., 1994; Rit-
tenhouse et al., 1994; Stickgold et al., 1994a,b, 2001; Sutton et al.,
1994a,b).
In Freudian dream analysis, content is the manifest and latent
content of a dream as it is remembered and its hidden meaning
respectively, (Freud, 1920). More recent empirical approaches to
content analysis have been pioneered by Hall, on the basis of thou-
sands of dream reports. Empirical categories, such as “characters”
and“social interactions,”were subsequently reﬁned and elaborated
by (Hall andVan deCastle, 1966). Most elements in a dream report
some ﬁt into one or more categories (e.g., hugging someone is a
friendly interaction and a physical activity). Content categories
can then be used to create indicators that pertain to the dreamer
or cohorts of dreamers. See Schredl (2010), for a contemporary
review of content analysis in sleep research.
Virtual reality dream theory asserts that we explore a poten-
tially inﬁnite repertoire of predictive dream scripts. These scripts
or scenarios are rehearsed in dreaming to provide an efﬁcient
(minimally complex) portfolio of explanations for thewaking sen-
sorium. However, the key thing we need to explain is why the
phenomenology of dreams is so (apparently) delusional, halluci-
natory and formally disordered. We will return to this issue after
reviewing the neurobiology of sleep and theories of dreaming.
A SELECTIVE HISTORY OF SLEEP AND DREAM SCIENCE
The discovery of brain activation in sleep by Aserinsky and Kleit-
man (1953)marked a turning point in the history of consciousness
science. The (REMsleep) brain activation they describedwas qual-
itatively similar to that of waking – as was the subjective experience
of dreaming. These similarities suggested an intimate relationship
between brain function in sleep and waking that we will consider
in later sections. First, we will look more closely at the nature of
REM sleep.
THE NEUROBIOLOGY OF REM SLEEP
The association of brain activationwithREMs suggests an endoge-
nous (brain stem) source of neuronal activation – and its role
in the internal generation of visual imagery in dreaming. The
description of REM sleep muscle atonia by Jouvet and Michel
(1959) helped to presage the idea that dreaming was constituted
by virtual perception and movement. Real (waking) perception
and movement were actively blocked, while the brain was forced
to generate a virtual simulacrum of waking consciousness. As the
physical basis of the most intense dreaming, REM sleep is gen-
erally taken to be the canonical physiological substrate of dream
consciousness.
The Aserinsky-Kleitman discovery led to a series of (largely
futile) attempts to test psychoanalytic theory, which then dom-
inated the intellectual scene. Because Michel Jouvet was a neu-
rosurgeon, not a psychiatrist or psychoanalyst (and French, not
American), he quickly exploited the biological signiﬁcance of his
discovery and proceeded to localize REM sleep control to the pon-
tine brain stem (Jouvet, 1962) and to attempt to characterize REM
genesis in neurochemical terms (Jouvet, 1969, 1972). Thus Jouvet
was able to add modulation (M) to the already strong evidence for
activation (A) and input–output gating (I) – three functions later
used to construct a quantitative AIM model of conscious brain
states (Hobson et al., 2000).
Other biologically grounded work showed that REM occurred
in most mammals and in young birds (Klein et al., 1964; Roffwarg
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et al., 1966; Allison and Cicchetti, 1976). REM was signiﬁcantly
overrepresented in immature mammals and birds – and was even
more evident with prematurity (Dreyfus-Brisac, 1964). At 30
weeks of gestational age, the percent of REM time has been esti-
mated at a hundred percent (Roffwarg et al., 1966; Dawes et al.,
1972; Birnholz, 1981). A neurodevelopmental function for REM
could therefore be safely assumed.
These facts suggested that to support abundant and vigorous
REM sleep, an animal needed to be large-brained and young.
These conclusions are relevant to virtual reality dream theory,
since they indicate both a neurodevelopmental function and a
synthetic strategy for consciousness. Of course, REM sleep is
not only present in young developing animals. Rather, its per-
sistence over the life span hints at continued instantiation of
intrinsic neuronal programs and the continuous modiﬁcation by
experience. The evidence that sleep favors learning is extensive
and REM sleep in particular enhances motor skill acquisition
(Walker et al., 2002; Diekelmann and Born, 2010). An intrigu-
ing discovery was that mammals and birds that evinced REM
were not only dreamers but thermoregulators as well. Cru-
cially, this thermoregulatory (homeothermic) capacity is lost
during REM sleep. These discoveries raise interesting questions;
for example, what is the functional evolutionary imperative of
REM sleep that compensates for the suspension of homeothermy
(Hobson and Friston, 2012) – andwhat is the relationshipbetween
thermodynamic and computational costs entailed by the brain
activity during REM sleep. We will address these questions
later.
THE NATURE OF REM SLEEP AND DREAMING
Many have emphasized the virtual and predictive aspect of dream-
ing and dream consciousness. For example, Llinás and Paré (1991)
considered the idea of dreaming and waking consciousness as pre-
dictive models of the world. For example, in their treatment of
dreaming and wakefulness they conclude: “These considerations
lead us to challenge the traditional Jamesian view of brain func-
tion according to which consciousness is generated as an exclusive
by-product of sensory input. Instead, we argue that consciousness
is fundamentally a closed-loop property, in which the ability of
cells to be intrinsically active plays a central role” (Llinás and Paré,
1991).
In a similar vein, Revonsuo presented a Virtual Reality
metaphor of consciousness arguing “that the subjective form
of dreams reveals the subjective, macro-level form of con-
sciousness in general and that both dreams and the everyday
phenomenal world may be thought of as constructed virtual
realities” (Revonsuo, 1995). It was later proposed that dreaming
is a preparatory, predictive simulation in the Threat Simula-
tion Theory (Valli et al., 2005). Thomas Metzinger and Jennifer
Windt have analyzed and reﬁned the idea of dreaming as a
model or simulation of the world that transcends waking and
dreaming consciousness: “what we call waking life is a form of
online dreaming” (Metzinger, 2003; p. 140). From this mix of
comparative neurobiology and philosophy grew our concept of
protoconsciousness and the virtual reality hypothesis (Hobson,
2009) – under which sensorimotor integration was supposed to
be inborn and develop in utero. This concept accommodates
the fact that dream consciousness precedes waking conscious-
ness by months in utero and hours in adult life – it emphasizes
self-as-agent, self-acting in a virtual (exteroceptive) space. Later,
we will consider implicit virtual reality models as the precur-
sor of generative models; namely, the models that emerge when
the brain engages with the job of explaining exteroceptive input
(after birth or sleep). We now turn to a promising area of
research that has revealed much about the functional anatomy
of sleep.
NEUROIMAGING
Brain imaging has revolutionized sleep research and is starting to
elucidate the neurobiology of consciousness. Over the past two
decades, positron emission tomography (PET) of human subjects
has revealed REM sleep activation, above the level of waking, in
the following regions:
• The pontine tegmentum (Maquet et al., 1996; Braun et al., 1997)
conﬁrming the results of Jouvet (1973) in the cat.
• The amygdala (Maquet et al., 1996; Braun et al., 1997;
Nofzinger et al., 1997) and the parahippocampal cortex (Braun
et al., 1997; Nofzinger et al., 1997) in keeping with the emo-
tionality of dreaming (Merritt et al., 1994).
• The parietal operculum (Maquet et al., 1996; Braun et al., 1997;
Nofzinger et al., 1997) a cortical hub for associative integration
(Hobson and Stickgold, 1994).
Complementing these positive ﬁndings is the singular and
unexpected observation of persistent deactivation of the frontal
cortex (speciﬁcally the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, Braun et al.,
1997; Nofzinger et al., 1997). Note that this is consistent with the
cognitive defects revealed by formal analyses of dreams.
The ﬁndings of brain imaging are surprisingly consistent and
robust. They conﬁrm – and extend to man –neurophysiological
ﬁndings in experimental animals. As such, they carry with them
the theoretical implications already noted from basic research. It
seems quite likely that the cellular and molecular mechanisms of
brain activation are the same acrossmammalian species, including
humans. These cardinal neuroimaging results are also consistent
with brain lesion studies, which we now touch upon.
THE NEUROPSYCHOLOGY OF DREAMING
The neuropsychologist Mark Solms interviewed and obtained
computerized axial tomography (CAT) data from several hundred
human subjects admitted to a London hospital. His ﬁndings com-
plement the PETdata: a complete loss of dreamingwas reported by
victims of stroke damage to either the occipito-temporo-parietal
junction or deep frontal white matter. Furthermore, a remarkably
astute examination of lobotomy subject records uncovered reports
of complete loss of dreaming following surgery.
Thus it seems reasonable to hypothesize (Solms, 1997) that
frontal projections are crucial to dreaming (although instrumen-
tal awakenings may be required to ensure that dreaming itself –
and not just the recollection of dreaming – is impaired by brain
lesions). Solms also afﬁrms Epstein (1977) and the PET amygdala
activation (Maquet et al., 1996; Braun et al., 1997; Nofzinger et al.,
1997) by establishing a possible contribution of the temporal lobe
to the hyperemotional, fugue-like and automatic quality of dreams
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(see dream phenomenology). The temporal lobe is notoriously
seizure prone (Epstein, 1977) and its REM sleep brain activation
by ponto-geniculo-occipital (PGO) wave excitation (Calvo et al.,
1992) is relevant to the hypothesis of a seizure-like process in
normal sleep.
LUCID DREAMING
Dreams, such as the specimen dream above, are normally delu-
sional as to the state of consciousness in which they unfold. The
dreamer supposes him or herself to be awake when he or she
is, in fact, fast asleep. This delusion is easily resolved by awak-
ening the dreamer, whose brain then becomes a more accurate
(sensory-bound) instrument. The delusion can also be recognized
and dispelled by introducing waking awareness into the dream.
This creates lucidity, which can be deﬁned as the conscious (dox-
astic) awareness that one is dreaming instead of believing, falsely,
that one is awake.
Lucid dreaming is of central importance to the virtual reality
hypothesis, because it clearly demonstrates the validity of three
foundational assumptions:
(1) There are two states of consciousness: one is waking and the other
is dreaming.
(2) Waking and dreaming consciousness are normally separate and
distinct, but,
(3) They can coexist as a hybrid state, in which both are present.
The hybrid state of lucid dreaming – however, rare and evanes-
cent – canbe scientiﬁcally investigated as shownby StevenLaBerge,
whose pioneering sleep lab studies proved that lucid dreaming – a
ﬁrst-person experience – always arises out of REM sleep and can
be identiﬁed by a third person observer (LaBerge, 1990). Simi-
larly, Ursula Voss has demonstrated that waking, non-lucid and
lucid dreaming have quantitatively distinct EEG power signatures
and that frontal lobe activation was lowest in non-lucid dreaming,
highest in waking, and intermediate in lucid dreaming (Voss et al.,
2012). Finally, Martin Dresler used fMRI to show that a distinct
brain circuit was activated in lucid dreaming – a circuit that might
mediate this curious state (Dresler et al., 2012).
The upshot of this work is that the brain mediates at least
three states of consciousness, each in precise and distinctive
ways. The crucial variable here is activation: both regional
and global brain activation can be spontaneously and voluntar-
ily changed to enhance one state of consciousness or another.
The incidence of spontaneous lucidity peaks at about age nine
(Voss et al., 2012), while volitional lucid dreaming can be cul-
tivated most easily in young adults, under the age of thirty
(Hobson, 2010).
Why age should be so crucial in determining dream lucidity is
a question for future investigation. Most studies of dreaming have
been conducted using young adult subjects – a limitation easily
overcome using journalistic and home-based recording methods
(Stickgold et al., 2001). Another interesting question concerns the
apparently divided “self” of lucid dreamers: one watches, while
the other dreams. Furthermore, the watching self can inﬂuence
dream continuation and command changes in dream content.
We speak of “being of two minds” and this is literally true in
the case of lucid dreaming. We also speak of “talking to our-
selves” – often in an encouraging way – as if we were indulging
in autosuggestion.
Emergence of the observing self is associated with frontal lobe
activation (Voss et al., 2009), a fact that accords well with executive
functions attributed to this region. We know that dreaming is a
brainstem-posterior forebrain affair (Jouvet, 1973; Maquet et al.,
1996) and that frontal lobe activation is suppressed inREM(Braun
et al., 1997; Nofzinger et al., 1997). The functionally“split brain”of
sleep may thus become a rich source of data for studies of volition
and metaconsciousness.
Having reviewed the functional anatomy of REM sleep and
dreaming, we now turn to more formal models of conscious
perception. Our hope is to explain the neurobiology and phe-
nomenology of the dreaming in theoretical terms that call on
generative models of the world.
VIRTUAL REALITY AND THE BAYESIAN BRAIN
Our thesis is that dreaming and REM sleep may hold the key
for understanding the nature of conscious inference and its neu-
rophysiological underpinnings. This understanding rests upon
viewing the phenomenology of dreams and their neurophysiol-
ogy in terms of perceptual synthesis – using a generative model of
the sensorium. This section considers the special role that dream-
ing has in optimizing virtual reality models in the brain. In brief,
we propose that dreaming and REMs are natural consequences of
model optimization – in which the model is optimized to min-
imize redundancy or complexity. This will become crucial from
the point of view of metabolism and energy efﬁciency – and its
association with sleep – considered in the next section.
In what follows, we will refer to the brain as performing infer-
ence. Inference is usually thought of as reasoning on the basis
of evidence; for example, inferring the probability of rain when
deciding to take a raincoat. Almost universally, inference can be
cast in terms of Bayesian inference, in which prior beliefs (April
showers are common) are combined with sensory evidence (dark
clouds over the horizon) to produce a posterior belief (it is likely
to rain). This posterior belief is the expectation that maximizes
Bayesian model evidence. We will take inference to be any process
that increases the Bayesian model evidence associated with pos-
terior expectations. Crucially, this inference may or may not be
consciously articulated – but can always be deﬁnedmathematically
and functionally.
THE BAYESIAN BRAIN
The notion that perception occupies the realm of a virtual reality
dates back to Plato and his allegorical cave – in which are sensory
impressions were likened to shadows cast by ﬁrelight on a cave
wall. Perception makes sense of these impressions and, necessar-
ily, entails some form of inference or modeling. This was most
clearly articulated by Helmholtz (1866/1962) in terms of uncon-
scious inference and the generation of explanations for sensory
impressions:
“Objects are always imagined as being present in the ﬁeld of vision aswould
have to be there in order to produce the same impression on the nervous
mechanism” – von Helmholtz
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Over the last century, this insight has been treated in several
guises – from Gregory’s notion of perception as hypothesis test-
ing (Gregory, 1980) to current formulations of the Bayesian brain
(Knill and Pouget, 2004). They all appeal to an underlying genera-
tive model from which predictions or hypotheses are drawn. One
might ask what why we equate (phenomenal) virtual realities with
(inferential) generative models.
The concept of virtual reality is often used to refer to the sub-
jective experiences of a self immersed in a world that appears real
(Revonsuo, 1995, 2006). The generative models that underlie the
Bayesian brain hypothesis may, at ﬁrst glance, fail to emphasize the
subjective aspect of virtual reality model. However, virtual real-
ity and generative models are formally equivalent – in the sense
that generative models generate predictions of sensory contact
with a world that is perceived through sensations. However, there
is an important distinction between virtual reality and genera-
tive models: the purpose of a generative model is to account for
(sensory) data. This means that when exposed to sensory infor-
mation, the generative model – embodied by the brain – is trying
to recapitulate reality through sensory exchanges with the world.
It is therefore constrained by reality. Only when asleep, is the
brain freed from sensory constraints to generate ﬁctive predic-
tions or a virtual reality proper. In short, we may be born with
a virtual reality model but sensory exchanges with the real world
quickly mould it into a generative model – with nightly reprises
from predicting sensations during sleep. Note that the generative
model is quintessentially subjective or ﬁrst-person because the
sensory predictions are unique to the self-as-agent in a sampled
world.
The most neurobiological plausible instance of this predictive
sampling is known as predictive coding; particularly of a hier-
archical sort (Srinivasan, Laughlin and Dubs, 1982; Rao and
Ballard, 1999; Bastos et al., 2012; Clark, 2013; Hohwy, 2013).
Predictive coding involves the updating of expectations about
hidden states of the world generating sensory data. This updat-
ing is driven by sensory information that cannot be explained
by current expectations or beliefs entertained by the brain. This
information is known as prediction error and is simply the
difference between sensory input and top-down or descending
predictions of that input.Whengeneralized tohierarchicalmodels,
the same reciprocal exchange of descending top-down predic-
tions and ascending or bottom-up prediction errors emerges.
This provides a nice metaphor for the recurrent message pass-
ing between levels of the cortical hierarchy – and accounts for
many anatomical and physiological aspects of extrinsic (long-
range) connections in the brain (Lee and Mumford, 2003; Friston,
2008; Bastos et al., 2012). The idea here is that prediction
errors inform expectations at higher levels of the hierarchy so
that they can send better predictions to lower levels – and
thereby suppress prediction error. If one can suppress predic-
tion error at all levels of the cortical hierarchy, then the implicit
expectations – encoded neuronally – provide a plausible expla-
nation for sensory input at multiple levels of description or
abstraction.
Clearly, this reciprocal message passing or hierarchical pre-
dictive coding rests upon a model that can generate top-down
predictions. It is this hierarchical model – entailed by cortical
hierarchies – which we associate with the virtual reality model
of dream theory. The principle that drives recurrent neu-
ronal exchanges is to minimize prediction error and thereby
make (Bayes) optimal predictions that underlie perceptual infer-
ence or synthesis. In this setting, minimizing prediction error
corresponds to maximizing Bayesian model evidence. Exactly
the same prediction error minimization underlies changes in
synaptic efﬁcacy – through associative or experience-dependent
plasticity – enabling the brain to acquire models of increas-
ing hierarchical depth. This is referred to as perceptual learn-
ing.
There is now a large body of circumstantial evidence for pre-
dictive coding in the brain, both in terms of hierarchical cortical
architectures and the canonicalmicrocircuits required to construct
predictions (Bastos et al., 2012; Adams et al., 2013a). In brief, cur-
rent thinking suggests that prediction errors are encoded by ﬁring
rates of superﬁcial pyramidal cells in the upper layers of the cortex.
The predictions, in turn, are conveyed by top-down or descend-
ing backward connections from deep pyramidal cells encoding
expectations or beliefs about (hidden) states in the world caus-
ing sensory impressions (Mumford, 1992; Bastos et al., 2012). But
what has this view of neuronal processing to do with sleep and
dreaming?
To understand this, we have to step back from predictive cod-
ing – and the minimization of prediction errors – and think about
the underlying quantity that is being optimized during perception.
From a statistical perspective, this quantity is the (Bayesianmodel)
evidence for the generative model. In other words, the model is
optimized or adjusted until the probability of sensations – over an
extended period of time – is the most probable under all models
that could be entertained. Practically, Bayesian model evidence is
very difﬁcult to compute, so a proxy is generally used both in statis-
tics and – we suggest – the brain. This proxy is called variational
free energy (Hinton and van Camp, 1993; Beal, 2003), leading to
the variational free energy formulation of perceptual inference and
learning (Dayan et al., 1995; Friston et al., 2006).
From the point of view of sleep, the key thing to appreciate is
that maximizing model evidence (or minimizing variational free
energy) does not just rest upon minimizing prediction errors but
also requires that they are minimized as parsimoniously as possi-
ble. Technically speaking, the (logarithm of the) Bayesian model
evidence can be decomposed into accuracy and complexity; where
log evidence increases with accuracy (small prediction errors) but
decreases with complexity – the degrees of freedom required to
make predictions (Penny et al., 2004). This means that there is an
imperative to minimize the complexity of generative models to
maximize their evidence.
COMPLEXITY AND SLEEP
Complexity is a measure of how complicated a generative model
is. In other words, complexity reﬂects the degrees of free-
dom – or numbers of parameters – that are required to provide
an accurate prediction of sensory data. Minimizing complex-
ity under the constraint of maintaining accurate predictions
is nothing more than the principle of Occam’s razor; formu-
lated in terms of Bayesian model selection (Penny et al., 2004).
Technically speaking, complexity is measured as the difference
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between prior beliefs (expressed as a probability distribution)
and posterior beliefs – after the prior beliefs have been updated
on observing sensory outcomes. We have previously discussed
the physiological basis for this complexity reduction in terms
of eliminating redundant parameters or synapses during sleep
(Hobson and Friston, 2012). This is exactly consistent with the
synaptic homoeostasis hypothesis and the role of sleep in prun-
ing unnecessary and exuberant synaptic connections (Gilestro
et al., 2009). This pruning minimizes the redundancy (com-
plexity) of the model and endows it with a parsimony and
hierarchical simplicity that is essential for efﬁcient and gen-
eralizable perceptual inference during waking (i.e., precludes
overﬁtting). In summary, the very notion of a model induces
the concept of model complexity and an associated cost func-
tion that has to comply with Occam’s principle. Physiologically,
we have suggested that sleep is necessary to minimize complexity
in order to ensure that our models are optimal during waking.
But what is special about sleep from point of view of model
optimization?
According to the AIM hypothesis, REM sleep is the quintessen-
tial state of perceptual processing in which the brain is sequestered
from sensory perturbations. This modulatory input gating is
crucial for minimizing complexity – because we can ignore the
accuracy part of model evidence (because there are no sensations
for which an accurate explanation is required). This means that
the brain can focus on minimizing complexity, using exactly the
same hierarchical prediction error minimization that it uses dur-
ing wakefulness. Indeed, statistical schemes that operate along
these lines can be found in powerful machine learning algorithms
such as the wake-sleep algorithm (Hinton et al., 1995).
Notice here, it is the synaptic connections learning associ-
ations and contingencies that are optimized, not the synaptic
activity inferring current states of the world. In other words,
brain activity is freed from explaining sensory input and is used
to generate ﬁctive predictions that produce prediction errors at
each level of the hierarchy. These prediction errors then drive
activity-dependent plasticity to minimize complexity (by min-
imizing prediction error). We have here the ﬁrst glimpse of a
functional explanation for the formal phenomenology of dreams.
The distinction between inference and learning is central to our
arguments – and the distinction between waking and dream-
ing perception. Inference corresponds to optimizing neuronal or
synaptic activity at a fast timescale over hundreds of milliseconds,
while learning corresponds to a slow optimization of synaptic con-
nections over minutes to hours. In waking, inference is enslaved
by sensory input and learning is driven vicariously by (experi-
ence dependent) plasticity. In contrast, during sleep there is no
sensory entrainment – and learning (synaptic plasticity) can only
reduce model complexity; in other words, make the generative
model internally consistent. This means the perceptual content of
dreams – encoded by synaptic activity – is ﬁctive in the sense
that it corresponds to real-world scenarios that never actually
occur. Put simply, the content of dreams is not a prediction of
what will happen but an exploration of what could (or could
not) happen that is necessary to minimize model complexity –
rendering it a more efﬁcient model of the experienced world on
waking.
COMPLEXITY MINIMISATION AND DREAM PHENOMENOLOGY
In the absence of sensory constraints, the vivid percepts
(McCarley and Hoffman, 1981), delusional beliefs (Hobson et al.,
2000) and cognitive defects (Hobson and Stickgold, 1994; Stick-
gold et al., 2001) cease to be delusional or defective – because these
attributes are only deﬁned in relation to sensory evidence. How-
ever, in sleep, there is no sensory evidence and the only imperative
is to adjudicate and select among unconstrained scenarios that can
be entertainedby the sleepingbrain. The implicit (protoconscious)
self-supervision may also explain frontal deactivation and the
temporary suspension of top-down constraints on lower-level rep-
resentations – representations or beliefs that compete for“synaptic
resources.”Asnoted above, this functional hypofrontalitymaypre-
clude the veridical self-awareness and doxastic attributions that
characterize dreaming.
In this view, dream content corresponds to expectations or
beliefs encoded by endogenous neuronal activity that both causes,
and is caused by, changes in synaptic connectivity. Both neu-
ronal activity and connectivity minimize prediction errors, even
in the absence of sensory input – because prediction errors are
prevalent throughout the depth of cortical and subcortical hier-
archies. The only difference between dreaming and waking is that
the precision (neuromodulatory gain) of prediction errors at the
lowest (sensory) levels and deepest (executive) is reduced – leaving
intermediate levels to sculpt themselves into a parsimonious and
self-consistent architecture, that will be more efﬁciently entrained
by the waking sensorium.
Interestingly, Jesse Prinz (2000) has argued that there is some-
thing special about processes that operate upon “intermediate-
level representations.” A natural speculation is that inferences
that are geared to action-selection predominate at intermediate
levels – apt for the selection and control of embodied action.
We will pursue this in setting of oculomotor control below.
However, the notion of intermediate cortical levels generating
a virtual reality – that is freed from both (bottom-up) sensory
constraints and (top-down) contextual constraints from pre-
frontal narratives – may also have something to say about dream
content.
If the purpose of dreaming is to simplify our model of the
world, why are dreams so diverse and, if anything, more complex
than the world itself? Hofstadter (1979) touches on this issue: by
exploring themes common to the works of the logician Gödel,
artist Escher and composer Bach, Hofstadter discusses how self-
reference allow systems to generate meaning. His treatment rests
on recursion and self-reference, in a way that is very reminiscent
of hierarchical inference and reciprocal message passing in the
brain. Hofstadter asserts that dreams are unpredictably diverse
and inﬁnitely creative. How does this ﬁt with complexity minimi-
sation? The key thing to note is that complexity is an attribute
of a model, not the content of (ﬁctive) inferences afforded by
a model. As noted above, the function of complexity minimisa-
tion is to ensure that the model can generalize. In other words,
minimizing the complexity of synaptic connections enables efﬁ-
cient inferences about a greater diversity of sensory scenarios –
scenarios that may be rehearsed during dreaming. It is the very
diversity of dream content that complexity minimisation aspires
to accommodate. In this sense, dreaming may prepare the brain
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for the unpredictable diversity of scenarios it encounters during
waking. Complexity minimisation therefore furnishes a plausible
perspective on the diversity of dream content but what about its
creative aspects?
Clearly, freed from the top-down (prefrontal) constraints of
narratives and perspective-taking, dream content can take on a
fantastical aspect that can entertain violations of temporal and
perspectival contiguity. But how does this relate to creativity?
A potential answer to this question may lie in daydreaming and
mind-wandering (McMillan et al., 2013). Several lines of research
have linked mind-wandering to creativity, especially in problems
that have been encountered recently (Baird et al., 2012). Using
an incubation task and a validated creativity task – the Unusual
Use Task – Baird et al. (2012) showed that creative problem solv-
ing can be enhanced by performing an undemanding distraction
task during an incubation period (c.f., eureka moments that come
out of the blue). In short, the ability to realize creative (generaliz-
able) associations rests on a temporary suspensionof cognitive and
attentional set – of the sort associated with the prefrontal cortex
(Christoff et al., 2009). This ﬁts comfortablywith the suspensionof
high level (prefrontal) constraints that we suppose helps optimize
associative connection strengths during sleep.
In summary, our explanation for the function of sleep sug-
gests that the brain is essentially doing the same thing in sleep
and waking; with one key difference – there is no sensory
input during sleep. However, the recurrent hierarchical message
passing is still in process; with continually changing expecta-
tions and hierarchical predictions that constitute dream content.
Physiologically, it appears that cholinergic discharges enable the
promulgation of ascending prediction errors at intermediate lev-
els of the cortical hierarchy, while aminergic neuromodulation
suppresses or gates ascending sensory input at the sensory level
(Hobson and Friston, 2012). This means that, from the brain’s
point of view, the world is still unfolding with deep hierarchi-
cal structure and perceptual content – the only thing that has
changed is that this content is no longer enslaved by sensory
information.
Having said this, the brain is still compelled to mini-
mize (extrasensory) prediction errors and implicitly complexity.
Heuristically, one can imagine how this proceeds by con-
sidering prediction errors as reporting inconsistent or over-
parameterizedmodels. As themodels are revised during dreaming,
different hierarchical representations become internally consis-
tent producing – on average – fewer hierarchical prediction
errors. The endpoint of this process is a hierarchical model
that can generalize to the diversity of sensory scenarios it
encounters during waking. This offers an explanation for the
function of sleep. But how does it explain the physiology of
sleep?
ACTIVE INFERENCE AND RAPID EYE MOVEMENTS
According to the AIM model, the transitions from wakefulness
to sleep rest upon a selective gating of sensory inputs that is
entirely consistent with the neurochemistry of the wake-sleep
cycle (Hobson, 2009). The selective pressure for this diurnal gat-
ing can now be motivated in terms of model optimization or
complexity minimization. Furthermore, the advantage afforded
by parsimonious but hierarchically deep models may explain
the association between REM sleep and higher levels of con-
sciousness in comparative sleep research (see above and Hobson,
2009).
One interesting aspect of this formulation is the special
status of eye movements during sleep. All perceptual infer-
ence is at some level active – in the sense that we actively
sample our sensorium to create our own sensations (Wurtz
et al., 2011; Brown et al., 2013). This embodied perspective
is referred to as active inference (Friston et al., 2011). This is
important because higher levels of the model are necessarily pro-
ducing multilateral top-down predictions of both visual (and
other exteroceptive) input and the proprioceptive consequences
of actively sampling that input. Indeed, under active inference,
the descending proprioceptive predictions become motor com-
mands that are fulﬁlled by peripheral reﬂexes in the spinal-cord
and pontine nuclei (Adams et al., 2013a). In this formulation,
classical reﬂexes simply minimize (proprioceptive) prediction
error.
This is important because – unlike the striatal muscle of the
motor plant – it is possible to move the eyes without changing
posture. In other words, proprioceptive predictions descending
within the central nervous system can engage the oculomotor
system with impunity. In turn, this means model optimization
during sleep (and in utero) can include predictions about visual
and oculomotor sensations that engage the full depth of the hier-
archy – spanning the visual (geniculo-occipital) system and the
(pontine) oculomotor system. Physiologically, this means that we
would expect to see classical oculomotor reﬂexes fulﬁlling pro-
prioceptive predictions – and producing eye movements in sleep
that are not dissimilar to saccadic eye movements. At the same
time, descending visual predictions will fall upon deaf ears (sic) as
they encounter the (gated) sensory level at the lateral geniculate or
early visual cortex. This provides a simple explanation for REMs
in REM sleep and – electrophysiologically – for their association
with PGO waves.
In summary, the generative or virtual model entertained by
the brain requires maintenance – in the sense it has to account
for a vast amount of sensory input during waking and can only
do this if it generalizes to every context encountered. This gen-
eralization rests upon minimizing model complexity (to avoid
overﬁtting sensory data), which is equivalent to minimizing
variational free energy in the absence of sensory input. The
neurophysiological validity of variational free energy minimiza-
tion – in terms of predictive coding and associative plasticity
– has already been established in terms of neuronally plausible
mechanisms (Friston et al., 2006; Bastos et al., 2012). Further-
more, we have discussed at length the role of sleep in enabling
this optimization (Hobson and Friston, 2012). This perspec-
tive provides a simple and mechanistically grounded account
of the neuromodulatory gating of cortical and subcortical sys-
tems, the selective expression of eye movements in sleep and
their association with PGO waves. In the penultimate section,
we will expand upon the role of virtual reality models in con-
scious inference. In the next section, we consider the relation-
ship between complexity minimization, energy regulation and
sleep.
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REM SLEEP, MODEL COMPLEXITY AND THERMODYNAMIC
EFFICIENCY
We have hinted at an intimate association between homoeother-
mic regulation and REM sleep in terms of comparative physiology.
There are some further fascinating links between thermoregula-
tion and REM sleep that we now pursue in light of complexity
(variational free energy) minimization during sleep.
A remarkable fact about REM sleep is that homeothermy is sus-
pended and temperature sensitive neurons in the hypothalamus
become temperature insensitive in REM (Parmeggiani, 2003). The
predictive coding formulation above provides a simple explana-
tion for the implicit loss of temperature control during sleep: if
aminergic modulation suppresses the sensitivity of principal cells
reporting sensory (interoceptive) prediction errors, then it will
preclude the signaling of thermoreceptors along unmyelinated C-
ﬁbers and delta-ﬁbers. In short, the brain will be impervious to
ﬂuctuations in temperature and will not respond to suppress ther-
mal prediction errors, resulting in a suspension of homeothermy.
So what evolutionary imperatives endorse this risky physiology?
The answer that emerges from the above arguments is that sleep
is an optimization process that is disclosed by the nightly removal
of sensory perturbations; in other words, the brain can take itself
off-line with impunity, so that synaptic plasticity and homoeosta-
sis (Gilestro et al., 2009) can reduce the complexity it has accrued
during wakefulness. In evolutionary terms, the adaptive cost of
nightly suspensions of homeothermy is offset by the reduction
of complexity costs afforded by sleep – provided environmental
temperature does not ﬂuctuate too much during sleeping (or in
utero).
As noted in Hobson and Friston (2012), the imperative to
reduce complexity during sleep may be greater for the (com-
plicated) brains of mammals (and birds). The failure to restore
complexity to minimal levels would, in principle, mean that
experience-dependent learning during the day would not be tem-
pered; leading to a colloquial and context-bound model of the
world that becomes increasingly complex and redundant. In statis-
tics, the equivalent pathology is known as “over-ﬁtting” and leads
to suboptimal models that fail to generalize beyond the data on
which they were trained. In short, taking the brain off-line to
prune exuberant associations established during wakefulness may
be a necessary price we pay for having a sophisticated virtual real-
ity model that can distil complex and subtle associations from the
sensorium. But is this the complete story?
In fact, there is a more fundamental link between complexity
minimization and thermoregulation that provides a thermody-
namic perspective on minimizing complexity costs. The argu-
ments here are subtle but simple (a detailed discussion can be
found in Sengupta et al., 2013). The premise is that minimizing
complexity implicitly maximizes the thermodynamic efﬁciency of
information processing in the brain. This premise can be veriﬁed
by noting that when the brain minimizes complexity it also min-
imizes its thermodynamic free energy (and the work needed to
attain that state). In short, a minimally complex brain state is also
in an energetic minimum:
Any system – including the brain – will minimize its
thermodynamic free energy when isolated from external forces
or perturbations. However, when isolated from sensory
perturbations, a system that is trying to minimize model evi-
dence (or variational free energy) will minimize complexity –
which means the state of minimum complexity is also the state
of minimum thermodynamic free energy. More generally, simpler
models are less costly both in terms of statistical or model com-
plexity and the thermodynamic work entailed by applying them
to (sensory) data. Quite literally, our might brains run a tiny bit
hotter after a sleepless night – as they try to inefﬁciently over-ﬁt
sensory data.
The notion – that a failure to minimize information-theoretic
free energy in sleep entails a failure to minimize thermody-
namic free energy – seems borne out by the fate of Rechtschaffen
et al.’s (1989) rats (Jim Hopkins – personal communication). As
Rosalind Cartwright reports (Cartwright, 2010, pp37–8) these
sleep-deprived rats died as a consequence of metabolic burn-out.
This apparently resulted froma failure to lower (or down-regulate)
their core body temperature (NREM and REM sleep had different
effects but REM deprivation alone was sufﬁcient). The mecha-
nisms remain unclear but – in the present context – speak to a
failure of (interoceptive) predictive coding, resulting (fatal) fail-
ures to minimize both information theoretic and thermodynamic
free energy.
Note that we are not saying the sleeping brain ﬁnds some equi-
librium steady-state of minimum energy consumption. Rather,
we are saying that the drive toward simpler models implicit in
synaptic regression– andother physiologicalmechanisms–during
sleep, renders the brain’s non-equilibrium steady-state function-
ing lessmetabolically expensivewhen averaged over both sleep and
wakefulness. In the next section, we will consider neuroimaging
evidence that large portions of the brain reduce their metabolic
rates during REM sleep – but other regions show activation during
REM sleep. Interestingly, the particular systems showing REM-
locked activation are those involved in intermediate hierarchical
representations and the enabling of message passing among those
levels.
In summary, we have seen that the imperative to minimize
model complexity is equivalent to optimizing the thermodynamic
efﬁciency of information processing in the brain. Given that the
previous section established sleep as necessary for complexitymin-
imization, it follows that sleep is also necessary to optimize the
metabolic efﬁciency of operating the virtual realitymodel inwake-
fulness. We now consider empirical evidence for the theoretical
considerations above, with a special focus on the neuronal systems
generating and searching ﬁctive visual scenes.
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FOR PREDICTIVE CODING DURING
SLEEP
In this section, we review recent functional magnetic resonance
imaging and electrophysiological evidence that is consistent with
the computational architecture implied above. Our focus is on
the correlates of REMs and the modulation of fast synchronous
(gamma) activity by (cholinergic) gating mechanisms in REM
sleep.
REM-LOCKED ACTIVATION IN THE BRAIN
We recently reported an fMRI study of the neural correlates of
REMs in sleep (Hong et al., 2009). REMs were identiﬁed from
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video recordings that detects about four times as many REMs
than conventional electrooculographic (EOG) approaches that are
usually used in fMRI studies (Wehrle et al., 2005; Miyauchi et al.,
2009). This is because removing MRI scanner artifacts from the
EOG also removes small amplitude eye movements. In contrast,
video monitoring reveals small eye movements, which is impor-
tant because both small and large eye movements can be detected
with fMRI (Kimmig et al., 2001).
Our key ﬁndings can be summarized as follows: REM-locked
activation is distributed but regionally speciﬁc. Peak activation is
clearly localized in primary visual and non-visual sensory cortex
and regions implicated in perceptual binding or synthesis: namely,
the thalamic reticular nucleus, claustrum, and basal cholinergic
forebrain. The reticular nucleus of the thalamus and claustrum
have been identiﬁed as structures that are crucial for binding infor-
mation distributed within and across different sensory modalities
(Crick, 1984; Crick and Koch, 2005). The role of the claustrum
in binding and salience detection has also been considered by
Smythies et al. (2012) andRemedios et al. (2010), respectively. Fur-
thermore, electrical stimulation of the claustrum has been shown
to produce reversible arrest of volitional behavior and unrespon-
siveness (Koubeissi et al., 2014). REM-locked activation was also
found in multisensory cortical areas indentiﬁed in waking stud-
ies (Calvert and Thesen, 2004). These include superior temporal
gyrus – a key region for audiovisual integration (Hein and Knight,
2008) – and the right retrosplenial cortex.
REM-locked activation overlaps with brain regions express-
ing or modulating gamma oscillations (Gross and Gotman, 1999;
Jouny et al., 2000); i.e., the thalamocortical sensory system (Llinas
and Ribary, 1993), mesopontine tegmentum (Steriade et al., 1991)
and basal forebrain (Szymusiak, 1995; Mesulam, 2004; Perry and
Perry, 2004). These ﬁndings are consistent with a role for REMs in
hierarchical multisensory integration that may be evident before
birth (Hobson, 2009) and through the life span (Bremner et al.,
2012).
NEUROMODULATORY GATING AND ELECTROPHYSIOLOGICAL
OSCILLATIONS
The basal forebrain cholinergic system can induce gamma
band synchronization, which is a potential mechanism for the
binding of distributed neuronal processes (Engel and Singer,
2001) – and regional enhancement of cortical sensory processing
(Szymusiak, 1995; Mesulam, 2004; Perry and Perry, 2004). From
the perspectives of the AIM model and predictive coding, cholin-
ergic modulation may play an important role in modulating and
gating prediction errors signals – a role that has been associated
with the deployment of attention in waking (Feldman and Friston,
2010) and the neurochemical modulation of hierarchical cortical
processing during sleep (Hobson and Friston, 2012).
Crucially, the rapid integration or binding of distributed neu-
ronal groups is thought to be required for conscious experience. It
has been proposed that “rapid integration is achieved through
the process of reentry, the ongoing, recursive, highly parallel
signaling within and among brain areas” (Tononi and Edelman,
1998). This ﬁts comfortably with the reciprocal message passing
mandated by predictive coding. Furthermore, the REM-locked
activation of brain regions commonly associated with binding and
high-frequency (gamma) synchronization is consistent with the
cholinergic boosting of superﬁcial pyramidal cells at intermedi-
ate levels in the cortex during REM sleep. Typically, superﬁcial
cortical layers show greater coherence and activity in the gamma
range; for example, the superﬁcial layers of cortex show neuronal
synchronization and spike-ﬁeld coherence predominantly in the
gamma frequencies, while deep layers prefer lower (alpha or beta)
frequencies (Roopun et al., 2006; Maier et al., 2010; Buffalo et al.,
2011). This is potentially important because – as noted above –
superﬁcial pyramidal cells are thought to encode prediction error
(Bastos et al., 2012).
Rapid eye movement-locked activation in the primary sen-
sory (olfactory or somatosensory) cortex does not necessarily
correspond to an olfactory or somatosensory dream experience
(Hong et al., 2009). In dreaming, people rarely smell (Zadra et al.,
1998) or feel touch (McCarley and Hobson, 1979). Instead, REM-
locked multisensory recruitment may reﬂect top-down priming
of sensory cortex (Tallon-Baudry and Bertrand, 1999; Calvert and
Thesen, 2004; Hong et al., 2009).
REMs are accompanied by PGO waves (Nelson et al., 1983).
REM-locked multisensory recruitment suggests that top-down
predictions – eliciting REM and PGO waves – involve visual
and non-visual components of the cortical hierarchy (Hobson
and Friston, 2012). Furthermore, brain activation time-locked
to REM (and PGO waves) is widespread; as predicted by the
activation-synthesis hypothesis (Hobson and McCarley, 1977).
However, while this activation is distributed, it is also highly
system-speciﬁc, engaging exactly those systems that are deployed
for hierarchical perceptual synthesis during visual palpation in
waking.
In short, these results are compatible with virtual reality dream
theory in that they demonstrate the activation of the brain in
REM sleep recapitulates that of waking. Given the phenomenol-
ogy of dreams, this is no great surprise – supporting the idea that
dreaming and waking mirror each other. Instead of arguing that
dreaming precedes rather than follows waking, one might argue
that waking and dreaming are two sides of the same coin – inter-
acting in a complementary and reciprocal fashion. Our two states
of consciousness are mutually enhancing rather than divisively
competitive.
DO REMs SCAN DREAM IMAGERY OR GENERATE IT?
A correlation between the density of REMs in sleep and reports
of visual experience in dreaming may indicate that REMs “scan”
the dream scene (Roffwarg et al., 1962; Herman et al., 1984;
Hong et al., 1995; Hong et al., 1997). Alternatively, it may indi-
cate that REMs play a role in generating dream images (Hong
et al., 2009). This issue is important because, in active inference,
eye movements are both cause and consequence of perception.
This is meant in the sense that a percept entails both visual and
proprioceptive predictions – and the latter induce movement
through oculomotor reﬂexes in sleep (REM) and wakefulness
(saccades).
Are REMs driven by dream imagery or do they generate it (or
both)? Studies in human subjects suggest that REMs are visu-
ally targeted eye movements – commanded by the forebrain – in
response to visual dream images (Roffwarg et al., 1962; Herman
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et al., 1984; Hong et al., 1995, 2009). In contrast, single cell record-
ing studies in animals have established that PGO waves that are
coupled with REMs (Nelson et al., 1983). PGO waves have been
interpreted as corollary discharges associated with brain stem ocu-
lomotor commands. We originally proposed that this discharge
might be associatedwith the generation of visual images in dreams
(Hobson et al., 2000). Indeed, from the perspective of predic-
tive coding, this corollary discharge corresponds to descending
visual predictions (of a virtual scene) that are an integral part of
perceptual inference – inference that determines dream content.
In short, two lines of research that initially appeared to contra-
dict each other now converge on the view that REMs are involved
in both the scanning and generation of dream imagery (Hong
et al., 2009). In other words, eye movements are both cause and
consequence of perceptual content – a notion that is becoming
increasingly dominant in the visual neurosciences. This “active
vision” perspective (Wurtz et al., 2011) is consistent with active
inference during waking, where perceptual content is used to gen-
erate top-down predictions of oculomotor sensations and their
consequences. This provides a nice model for saccadic eye move-
ments that are essential for waking perception (Yarbus, 1967)
and sequential updating of sensory samples (Friston et al., 2012).
Saccadic searches of the visual world in wakefulness are neces-
sary for testing models of the world and serially updating the
ensuing hypotheses with data sampled through scanning. This
has been simulated in terms of active inference (Friston et al.,
2012) – and has been pursued in the context of abnormalities
seen in schizophrenia (Adams et al., 2012). Recordings of sac-
cadic eye movements show that they are attracted to parts of the
visual scene that have salient or precise information; e.g., the eyes
and lips (Yarbus, 1967). These saccadic searches are performed
automatically and quickly: about four to eight eye movements
per second, which is interestingly about the same frequency of
PGO waves and bursts of REM in sleep. It therefore appears that
both waking saccadic searches and REMs are an integral part
of active vision (Wurtz et al., 2011) – in much the same way
that we infer the nature of an object in the dark by palpitating
it.
However, there is no visual world to be scanned by a fetus.
REM sleep is nonetheless preponderant in the third trimester of
pregnancy. How can we interpret this fact? The answer is simple:
although there are no precise visual (exteroceptive) consequences
of movement, there are proprioceptive consequences that have to
be learnt – and can be learned in utero. If this observation is right,
REMs would be essential to enable the brain to model the (propri-
oceptive) consequences of eye movements that will be necessary
during active visual searches. Crucially, REM sleep deprivation in
immature rats suggests that endogenously generated visual activa-
tion during REM sleep plays a necessary role in development of
the visual system (Shaffery et al., 2002).
Waking imagery studies (Brandt and Stark, 1997; Laeng and
Teodorescu, 2002) suggest that information pertaining to saccadic
sequences is maintained together with the visual representation –
and is used as spatial index for the proper arrangement of image
components during image generation (in dreaming) and per-
ceptual synthesis (in waking). Again, we conclude that REMs
are involved both in saccadic searches of the dream image and
in its generation. In the setting of active inference, REMs are
the peripheral expression of top-down proprioceptive predictions
based upon active visual palpation of a virtual scene generated in
the cortical hierarchy. It is therefore sensible – from the virtual
reality perspective – that dream perception and its proprioceptive
manifestation share a common visual theme.
Further evidence supports the view that REMs are involved
in the generation of a virtual reality. First, REM-locked acti-
vation is greater in the posterior left hemisphere (Hong et al.,
2009) that appears to be crucial for generation of dream imagery
(Farah, 1984). Second, REM-locked activation in language areas
speaks to the involvement of association (semantic) cortex (Hong
et al., 2009) and its reciprocal interaction with lower (sen-
sory) cortex (e.g., Tallon-Baudry and Bertrand, 1999). Finally,
REM-locked activation is seen in primary somatosensory cor-
tex, premotor cortex, vestibular cortex, insula, anterior cingulate
cortex, putamen, and superior temporal gyrus (Hong et al.,
2009). These regions have all been implicated in represent-
ing the embodied self (Blanke, 2012) – suggesting that REMs
may be involved in the generation of (bodily) self images in
dreaming.
SOME CLUES FROM ELECTROPHYSIOLOGY
There are two key neurobiological candidates for modulat-
ing synaptic gain that are implicated in both REM sleep and
attentional gating: synchronous gain (Chawla et al., 1999) medi-
ated by fast oscillatory or synchronized activity (Womelsdorf
and Fries, 2006) and classical neuromodulatory (e.g., choliner-
gic) neurotransmission (Schroeder et al., 2001; Hirayama et al.,
2004). Furthermore, both of these gating mechanisms inﬂu-
ence each other: as noted above, gamma oscillations are
profoundly affected by acetylcholine, which is released into
sensory cortex from nuclei in the basal forebrain. Acetyl-
choline acts through both fast ion channel (nicotinic) recep-
tors and slow metabotropic (muscarinic) receptors (Hasselmo
and Giocomo, 2006). Acetylcholine appears to increase synap-
tic gain directly by, for example, reducing spike-frequency
adaptation. It may also facilitate the induction of gamma
oscillations by reducing adaptation in pyramidal cells or
decreasing activity of inhibitory interneurons (Börgers et al.,
2005).
Human intracranial EEG shows that cortical gamma power
is enhanced during phasic REM sleep (but not tonic REM sleep
associated with generalized atonia). Similarly, rat hippocampus
shows increased gammasynchronyduringphasicREMsleep,while
gamma power and ﬁring rates decrease during tonic REM sleep
(Montgomery et al., 2008). Therefore, gamma power may be pref-
erentially expressed during phasic REM sleep, enabling message
passing among intermediate levels of the cortical hierarchy (and
explaining the relatively low gamma–REM association found by
Le Van Quyen et al., 2010).
Interestingly, there is reduced EEG coherence in the gamma
band between cortical areas duringREMsleep (Castro et al., 2013).
This is not inconsistent with the functional disconnection or
suspension of top-down constraints implied by the exploratory
nature of ﬁctive predictive coding during complexity minimiza-
tion. Indeed, “The virtual absence of gamma frequency coherence
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during REM sleep may underlie the unique cognitive process-
ing that occurs during dreams, which is principally a REM
sleep-related phenomenon” (Castro et al., 2013).
Another important electrophysiological hallmark of predictive
coding is the mismatch negativity (MMN), elicited as an event
related potential difference by oddball or deviant stimuli. These
responses have often been associated with prediction errors. There
is some evidence that an analog of the MMN can be elicited in
REM sleep “despite the gross suppression of both executive top-
down processing and external input transmission (Atienza et al.,
2000; Ibáñez et al., 2009)” (Yordanova et al., 2012). Interestingly,
no MMN has been recorded during non-REM sleep and slow
wave sleep (Yordanova et al., 2012), suggesting that there may be
something special about the activated brain state in REM sleep
that enables descending predictions (necessary to produce the
mismatch response).
In summary, much of the empirical evidence pertaining to the
neurophysiology of REM sleep – as obtained through invasive
and non-invasive studies – implicates the functional anatomy that
underlies perceptual synthesis and binding. Furthermore,many of
the neurophysiological correlates of REMs in sleep are consistent
with neuronal implementations of predictive coding based on vir-
tual reality or generative models. In particular, the involvement of
brain systems that underlie active visual inference account for both
the prevalence of visual content in dreaming perception and the
prominence of REMs– and their associatedPGOwaves. In thenext
section, we consider the implications of the virtual reality model
for understanding conscious inference – and the special role that
dreaming may play in disclosing the anatomy of consciousness.
VIRTUAL REALITY DREAM THEORY AND CONSCIOUSNESS
There are clear echoes in active inference of Kant’s search for
the a priori conditions for the possibility of experience (Kant,
1999/1781). The prenatal evidence of highly organized brain activ-
ity of the fetal brain in utero (Birnholz, 1981) is a cogent of modern
ﬁndings in this regard. The post-natal prevalence of REM sleep is
also relevant but it could be argued that neonatal infants have
an abundance of novel experiential data to assimilate into their
generative models during sleep. In both cases, it seems likely that
important statistical and thermodynamic processes are at work at
this point in neurodevelopment.
We have already shown that several issues in consciousness
research (Chalmers, 1996; Wegner, 2003) can be addressed when
the brain is treated as an organ of inference (Hobson and Friston,
2014). In what follows, we brieﬂy review how appealing to the
process of inference, implicit in the deployment of virtual reality
models, may provide plausible answers to metaphysical questions.
CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS INFERENCE
In the preceding sections, we have seen how the virtual reality
model underlies inference in the brain – and how statistical imper-
atives persist during sleep. The neurobiological generation and
reﬁning of perceptual fantasies during dreamingwas considered in
light of predictive coding and the neuromodulatory gating effects
of sleep. The previous section reviewed the empirical neurophysi-
ological evidence in support of this formulation. Here, we return
to our assertion that sleep and dream research can cast light upon
some aspects of consciousness.
In Hobson and Friston (2014), we put forward the simple argu-
ment that consciousness can – at some level – be equated with
inference. The idea here is that the dualism implied by the res cog-
itans and res extensa (realm of the mind and realm of extensive
physical reality: Manuel, 2001, p. 97) can be resolved through the
biophysical act of inference; namely, neuronal message passing in
the sleeping and waking brain. This dual aspect monism follows
from the fact that the biophysical state of the brain encodes prob-
abilistic beliefs that minimize prediction error (or variational free
energy). In other words, the dynamics of synaptic activity and
efﬁcacy are driven by quantities (variational free energy) that are
functions of beliefs (probability distributions) encoded by those
biophysical quantities. For example, population activity at theneu-
ronal level may encode the expectation or mean of a Gaussian
probability distribution over some hidden state of the world. The
very fact that dynamical forces on the physical brain are produced
by (functions of) probability distributions links the physical (res
extensa) to the mindful (beliefs or res cogitans) in a fundamen-
tal way. Another perspective on this bridge over the Cartesian
divide is that it provides a (wide sense) realization relationship
(Wilson, 2001; Gillett, 2002). In other words, the process of infer-
ence affords a unique mapping between physical (neuronal) states
and the properties (probabilistic beliefs) they realize (c.f., Bechtel
and Mundale, 1999).
In short, we cast perception in terms of inference, where
inference is associated with a distinctive functional property or
role (i.e., hierarchical message passing). This functional role is
realized by neuronal populations that encode probability distri-
butions. This makes this theory a functionalist theory, which
links mental to physical states as roles to realizers. As far as
metaphysics goes, this is then a theory that is consistent with
(i) a thoroughgoing reductive physicalism, if we identify men-
tal states with the physical states that realize the roles, or (ii)
a non-reductive physicalism, if all and only physical states play
the functional roles (in the actual world), and/or (iii) with a
property dualism, if realizers and roles are considered distinct
properties. Property dualism is the modern type of dual aspect
theory.
Many of the interesting insights offered by equating conscious-
ness with the process of inference rest on the hierarchical nature of
generative or virtual reality models. In hierarchical models, infer-
ence can be decomposed into multiple levels, with progressively
higher or deeper levels of representational abstraction or expla-
nation. This leads to the distinction between inferences at low
levels of sensory hierarchies – that can be associated with uncon-
scious inference in the sense of Helmholtz (1866/1962) – and at
higher levels that could be associated with conscious percepts and
concepts.
To illustrate the importance of hierarchical inference consider
a concrete example, starting at the lowest level of the hierar-
chy; namely, a reﬂex. A peripheral reﬂex counters deviations
from a proprioceptive equilibrium point set by descending cor-
ticopontine or corticospinal projections. One can associate this
equilibrium point with the set point of a thermostat. From a sta-
tistical perspective, the neuronal activity encoding the equilibrium
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point corresponds to the expected (or mean) proprioceptive input
and the gain of peripheral motor neurons encodes the inverse
variance (or precision) (Adams et al., 2013a). Does this neuronal
encoding of a probability distribution constitute consciousness?
In the sense that it encodes a probabilistic belief, one might argue
that even a simple knee-jerk reﬂex embodies some form of uncon-
scious (motor) belief. However, things get more interesting if the
descending proprioceptive predictions (motor commands) arise
from a higher hierarchical level with autonomous dynamics (e.g.,
a central pattern generator). At the higher level, one can interpret
neuronal activity (and gain) as encoding expectations (and preci-
sion) of movement trajectories, framed in terms of proprioceptive
input.
These are beliefs about motion that entail both past and future;
immediately freeing beliefs from the instant in time that they
are fulﬁlled. Consider now a further hierarchical level that pre-
dicts (and selects) the particular trajectory that is enacted. This
level may generate top-down predictions of proprioceptive tra-
jectories and their visual consequences. In other words, we have
moved beyond simplemotor representations to a hierarchical level
where expectations (neuronal activity and their associated beliefs)
are quintessentially sensorimotor in nature. At this level, the
multimodal nature of descending predictions (aka corollary dis-
charge) renders the expectations amodal. Would these constitute
conscious experience?
One could argue that these high-level, dynamically structured
beliefs are much closer to phenomenal consciousness. Further-
more, if we now equip our hierarchical model with models that
distinguish between the consequences of self-made acts and the
acts of others, we start to get closer to conceptual expectations of
the sort that may underlie subjective consciousness. Crucially, at
all hierarchical levels, the biophysical drives underlying neuronal
activity are physically lawful in that they minimize variational free
energy – in exactly the same way that gravitational forces conform
to Hamilton’s principle of least action.
HIERARCHICAL INFERENCE AND DREAMING
The notion of hierarchical representation comes to the fore in
the context of dreaming. First, we have the hierarchical dis-
tinction between sensory and higher levels. This is important
because modulatory gating during REM sleep has opposing effects
on the two levels – effectively suppressing the sensory level and
augmenting message passing among higher levels through selec-
tive activation of ascending cholinergic systems. This means that
Bayesian belief updating is implicit in the sleeping brain in a
way that is formally equivalent to predictive coding of (non-
gated) sensory input during wakefulness. However, the nature
of conscious inference is fundamentally different in the sense
that beliefs – encoded by neuronal activity and plasticity – are
unconstrained by sensory information, permitting fantastical
constructions.
Second, in the setting of hierarchical models, each hierarchical
level or system makes inferences about others. This is exactly the
conclusion reached from analysis of the phenomenology of lucid
dreaming. Recall from above that the notion of watching oneself
implies a partition of consciousness into the “watcher” and the
“watched.” This is consistent with a hierarchical decomposition
of inference during sleep. It could even be argued that the same
hierarchical decomposition or meta-representational interpreta-
tion applies during wakefulness – and emerges as meta-cognition
(awareness of being aware).
Recently, it has been shown that transcranial alternating cur-
rent stimulation, at low gamma frequencies, induces lucidity and
self-reﬂective awareness in REM dreaming (Voss et al., 2014). The
authors assume that “lower gamma band activity is mediated by
activation of fast spiking interneurons that are known to gen-
erate gamma oscillations.” The ensuing oscillations have been
proposed to increase the synchronous gain of neuronal message
passing. This suggests that lucid dreaming may be associated with
an increase in the precision of prior beliefs (in prefrontal cortex)
that underlie personal narratives (Kiebel et al., 2008) – priors that
are quiescent in normal REM sleep. We again see the importance
of neuromodulation in contextualizing the relative contribution
(of higher, intermediate and sensory) hierarchical processing in
the induction of conscious states. See Figure 1.
In summary, the inferential perspective on conscious processes
creates a hierarchically composed theater for conscious expe-
rience that accommodates the distinction between waking and
dreaming consciousness (through a dissociation of sensory and
non-sensory hierarchical levels) and dissociation within higher
levels that would be necessary for lucid dreaming. Within this
framework, many of the formal characteristics of perception and
cognition during dreaming start to make sense – in terms of
a free-running inference machine that is untethered from the
sensorium.
CONCLUSION
Conceiving of the mind as a physical force – tied to the struc-
ture and function of the brain – is not novel but giving it a detailed
instantiation formalizes its scientiﬁc status.We have suggested that
many of the formal properties of dreams (e.g., internally generated
visual imagery, delusional beliefs about the waking state, cognitive
deﬁcits in self-reﬂective awareness, disorientation, impaired voli-
tion, recent memory loss, and hyper-emotionality) are delirium,
by deﬁnition. If the explanations on offer are true, one can now
supply the cellular and chemical basis for this (entirely normal)
delirium. In doing so, we move the conscious states of dreaming
and waking into their long-sought relation to brain activity. Vir-
tual reality dream theory does not have to solve the brain–mind
problem, but may contribute to the solution. This contribution
raises interesting questions for example; is REM sleep necessary
for consciousness?
According to the arguments in this paper, REM sleep enables
the optimisation (complexity minimisation) of deep hierarchical
models and may therefore be necessary for the conscious (infer-
ence) processes that are unique to deep models. Having said this,
REM sleep is clearly not necessary for the emergence of embod-
ied virtual reality models in species that do not evidence REM
sleep and – to the extent that these species are conscious – it is
not necessary for consciousness. Perhaps answers to these sorts of
questions are not as important as the fact that these questions can
be addressed formally, using the notion of hierarchical inference
and virtual reality models that are grounded in neurobiological
and evolutionary processes.
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FIGURE 1 |The schematic illustrates the neuromodulatory gating of
hierarchical message passing in the brain during rapid eye movement
(REM) sleep (top), wakefulness (right), and the hybrid state of lucid
dreaming (left).The anatomy of this schematic should not be taken too
seriously: it is just meant to differentiate between different levels of the
cortical hierarchy in terms of low (sensory) levels, intermediate (extrasensory
and multimodal) levels and – for the purposes of this paper – high
(meta-representational) levels. Here, we have associated higher levels with
theory of mind areas that are engaged in mentalizing and perspective taking
tasks.Within each level we have depicted representative cortical microcircuits
in terms of superﬁcial (red triangles) and deep (black triangles) pyramidal cells.
In predictive coding formulations of neuronal message passing, superﬁcial
pyramidal cells encode prediction error that is passed up the hierarchy to
update the activity of deep pyramidal cells encoding expectations (red
connections). These reciprocate top-down predictions that are compared with
the expectations by prediction error units in the level below (black
connections). In REM sleep, the idea is that cholinergic modulation (blue
projections) of superﬁcial pyramidal cells at intermediate levels of the cortical
hierarchy preferentially enables these levels, while suppressing ascending
prediction errors from primary sensory cortex. In lucid dreaming, aminergic
(e.g., dopaminergic: pink projections) neuromodulation sensitizes prediction
errors in the prefrontal cortex, enabling top-down predictions from the highest
or deepest levels of the hierarchy – endowing processing in intermediate
levels with a narrative or context. In waking, aminergic (e.g., noradrenergic)
neuromodulation boosts sensory prediction errors that are now able to
entrain hierarchical inference in higher cortical levels for perceptual synthesis.
In short we have a mechanistic account of processes underly-
ing conscious and unconscious inference, where thismechanism is
fully embedded in a causal nexus of neuronal machinery. Potential
beneﬁciaries of this account are our concepts of psychopathology;
for example, psychosomatic disorders. If themind is a causal phys-
ical force, then mental states can be orderly (as in physical and
mental health) or disorderly (as in physical and so-called mental
disease). Many have assumed that this must be so – and indeed
have fruitfully pursued predictive coding in this context (Fletcher
and Frith, 2009; Edwards et al., 2012; Adams et al., 2013b; Hohwy,
2013). The general point that we wish to make is that clinical
psychology and psychiatry are in a position to change – and arm
themselves with insights from sleep and dream science.
Clearly, there are many fascinating issues that we have not con-
sidered – issues that could be pursued from the Bayesian brain
perspective offered in this article. One intriguing issue (noted
by our reviewers) is the role of prediction in active inference:
in other words, the role of hierarchical inference in prescribing
predictions about how we will move or what we will do next. Cur-
rently, we have just focused on perceptual inference and making
sense of the sensorium. It is intriguing to consider that dream-
ing and model optimization may also apply to inferences about
our actions and how we sample outcomes from the world during
wakefulness.
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